

















Enforcement of the Law in the 
People´s Republic of China 
- with focus on international civil 




Elena Maria Irnsperger (IRNELE001) 
Master of Laws 
 
Word Count: 23.223 
 
Submitted to: 
The University Of Cape Town 
Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town 
 
Date of submission: 15 September 2014 
 
Supervisor: Avv. Professor Ignazio Castellucci 










The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 














Research dissertation/research paper presented for the approval of Senate in 
fulfilment of part of the requirements for the Master of Laws in approved 
courses and a minor dissertation/research paper. The other part of the 
requirement for this qualification was the completion of a programme of 
courses. 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of the Master of Laws dissertations/research papers, including 
those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this 








The main aspect of the paper is the investigation of the enforcement of law of 
foreign (and domestic) judgments as well as arbitral awards in People´s 
Republic of China (PRC). The focus lies on international civil litigation and 
arbitration. For this purpose it is essential to elaborate on the judicial structures 
and its impact on the enforcement of laws in the PRC. The court system as well 
as its size and performance, the prosecution system, the lawyer system, the 
jurisdiction and the arbitration system will be briefly discussed. 
Thereafter, the study focuses on the recognition and enforcement of civil 
judgements and arbitral awards in the PRC. The organization of the 
enforcement and its procedure, laws and regulations in general will be 
addressed before the enforcement of civil judgements and arbitral awards will 
be investigated in detail. The investigation of the enforcement of judgments in 
the people’s courts of China is separated in the enforcement of domestic 
judgments and foreign judgments. While examining the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards it is important to consider the different categories 
of awards. 
In the following the challenges and obstacles facing the Chinese judicial system 
will be determined. The legal education, the lack of professionalism, local 
protectionism and the lack of judicial independence are just some of them. The 
progress China has made in the last decades will also be mentioned. Especially 
the judicial reforms from 1999 to 2014 and the efforts made to improve the 
enforcement of law. In addition the practical side will be determined, therefore, 
important or recent cases will be considered. 
The goal of the paper is to give an overview of the current social and economic 
environment of law enforcement and the measures which should be taken to 
improve the law enforcement in the PRC. Due to the lack of official statistics in 
regard of law enforcement in the PRC, the study is based on collected 
information from different sources. 
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The increase of foreign businesses in the PRC and the expanding international 
relationships of China1 make it on the one hand necessary to deal with the legal 
system of the PRC. According to the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC foreign 
investments of roughly USD 117.5 billion2  were made in 2013.3 On the other 
hand the Chinese government has to proceed to establish a credible legal 
environment and to monitor the implementation and enforcement of the law.4 
Jurisdiction, choice of law, and the enforcement of (foreign) judgments are the 
three main issues foreign parties are concerned about while seeking judicial 
relief and remedies in China.5  As noted above, this paper determines the latter. 
Implementation of law is about law in action and not law in the books, Eugene 
Bardach an American authority on implementation problems once said6: 
‘It is hard enough to design public policies and programs that look good 
on paper. It is harder still to formulate them in words and slogans that 
resonate pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and the constituencies 
to which they are responsive. And it is excruciatingly hard to implement 
them in a way that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed 
beneficiaries or clients.’7 
 
China has made great efforts in the construction and reform of its legal system, 
you almost can say it has a complete legal system. Chinese legislators have 
enacted abundant national laws, and quite a lot of these are related to foreign 
                                                          
1 China in this paper means Mainland China, which excludes Taiwan and the Special Administrative Regions of 
Hong Kong and Macau.  
2 Ministry of Commerce Website, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigninvestment/201402/20140200498911.shtml accessed on 
30.04.2014. 
3 The top ten nations and regions with investment in China (as per the actual input of foreign capital) are as follows: 
Hong Kong (USD78.302b), Singapore (USD7.327b), Japan (USD7.064b), Taiwan Province (USD5.246b), U.S.A. 
(USD3.353b), R.O.K.(USD3.059b), Germany (USD2.095b), Holland (USD1.281b), U.K. (USD1.039b) and France 
(USD762m), total of which accounted for 93.15% of total actual use of foreign investment in the country. 
4 Albert Hung-Yee Chen An  introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (2004) Foreword X 
(hereinafter A.HY Chen An introduction to the Legal System of the PRC). 
5 Mo Zhang International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the Chinese Judicial System (2002), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol25/iss1/3 on 61 (hereinafter M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China). 
6 Jianfu Chen ‘Implementation of Law in China  –  An Introduction’ in Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li, Jan Michiel Otto (eds) 
Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China (2002) on 1 (hereinafter Chen Implementation of Law in 
China  – An Introduction). 
7 Ibid. 
6 
affairs.8  Even so having laws is one thing, having them properly implemented is 
another.9 The Western-style rule of law is not simply about the making of law, 
even if the law concerned is equitable and just. The law also has to be 
implemented and administered impartially, equitably and independently.10  In 
Western societies law is a set of general written rules, in public knowledge, 
covering nearly all areas of life, applicable to all subjects in the relevant 
jurisdiction, whether private or public entities, but only prospectively not 
retroactively. These rules are especially also binding for the government and 
the ruling elite. Furthermore they are always enforceable by a court of law, 
according to legal procedures entrusted to legal professionals. The decisions 
are made without any influence of other values – such as tradition, politics, 
ethics or economic advantages etc.11 These various factors lead to legal 
certainty. Legal certainty is one of the most important purposes of a legal 
system. Especially, in developing and transitional countries the lack of legal 
certainty is a major problem. Proper legal certainty summarized requires that: 
there are clear, consistent and accessible legal rules, issued or acknowledged 
by or on behalf of the state; the government institutions apply these rules 
consistently and themselves comply with them; most citizens in principle 
conform such rules; in the course of dispute settlement, independent and 
impartial judges apply such rules consistently; and their judicial decisions are 
actually put into practice.12 
It is obvious, that the role of law in the PRC has been and still is different. 
Particularly, it is not a role of a general set of rules always applicable to all.13 
                                                          
8 Shaping Shao ‘The theory and practice of the implementation of international law in China’ in Jianfu Chen, Yuwen 
Li, Jan Michiel Otto (eds) Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China (2002) on 197 (hereinafter Shao 
The theory and practice of the implementation of international law in China). 
9 Jianfu Chen ‘Mission Impossible: Judicial efforts to enforce civil judgements and rulings in China’ in Jianfu Chen, 
Yuwen Li, Jan Michiel Otto (eds) Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China (2002) on 85 (hereinafter 
Chen Mission Impossible: Judicial efforts to enforce civil judgements and rulings in China). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ignazio Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the People’s Republic of China (2012) on 4 (hereinafter 
Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the PRC). 
12 Jan Michiel Otto ‘Toward an analytical framework: Real legal certainty and its explanatory factors ’ in Jianfu Chen, 
Yuwen Li, Jan Michiel Otto (eds) Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China (2002) on 25 (hereinafter 
Toward an analytical framework). 
13 Ignazio Castellucci ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Law in Chinese Context’ in 4 Matteo Ricci Institute Studies 
Series Culture, Law and Order Chinese and Western Traditions (2007) on 92. 
7 
Moreover it has to be mentioned that in the PRC the law and its enforcement 
are actually two different political issues. In Western societies the enforcement 
of a judgement, for example, has to be an automatic consequence of law.14 
Hence, the processes of implementation and enforcement of law play an 
important role.15 The enforcement of law, as the last stage of the civil 
procedure, not only directly affects the rights of the parties, but also the respect 
for law and the authority of the courts, as well as social stability and economic 
development.16 Thus, enforcement of law is to realize legal rights, because: 
‘When judgments are not executed, the law is worth nothing’ —“The masses”.17 
 
 
2. AN OVERVIEW – LEGAL HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE`S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 
 
It is quite improbable to understand the legal system of a nation without 
knowing its history. Recent laws are rooted from the culture and tradition of a 
society.18 Hence, a brief historical review through the Chinese legal system 
follows. 
Traditional China as an ancient civilization with thousands of years of history, 
had its own legal system with unique features. The legal culture and heritage 
plays an important role. Traditional Chinese conceptions of law have been 
mostly influenced by the writings of traditional schools of philosophy. Of these, 
particularly two had a huge influence, namely Ru Jia (Confucianism) and Fa Jia 
(Legalism).The terminus a quo of Confucianism was its emphasis on the 
educational function of morality (li) in governing a state. That is, Confucianists 
believed that people were educable and, by education through li, an ideal social 
                                                          
14 Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the PRC on 59. 
15 Chen Implementation of Law in China  –  An Introduction on 2. 
16 Qing-Yun Jiang Court Delay and Law Enforcement in China, Civil process and economic perspective (2006) on 
196 (hereinafter Jiang Court Delay and Law Enforcement in China).  
17 Donald C.Clarke Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: the Enforcement  of Civil Judgements (1996), 
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=faculty_publications accessed on 20.04. 
2014. 
18 Daniel Chang Modernization of the Chinese Legal System: A Brief Historical Review, 
http://www.nzcta.co.nz/chinanow-commentary/1517/modernization-of-the-chinese-legal-system-a-brief-historical-
review/ accessed on 23.08.2014 (hereinafter Chang A Brief Historical Review). 
8 
order could be created on the basis of virtue (de). Regarding the role of law (fa) 
Confucianists strongly rejected the Legalists who emphasised the necessity of 
using serious punishment for maintaining a desired social order. According to 
Confucianism, only a government based on virtue and morality could truly win 
the hearts of men. This doctrine is reflected in one of the most famous 
Confucian passages: 
‘Lead the people by means of regulations and keep order among them 
through punishments (xing), and the people will flee from you and will 
lose any self-respect. But lead them by virtue (de) and keep order among 
them by establishing morality (li), and they will keep their self-respect and 
come to you.’19 
 
The influence of legal and cultural heritage on China as of today does not, 
perhaps, educe directly from specific teaching of Confucianism or Legalism, but 
rather from traditional patterns of thinking (morality v. punishment), the structure 
of institutions (the family as a central unit), conceptions and assumption about 
law (law as punishment), and the function of law (law as a political and 
administrative tool for maintaining social order).20 
In any case, law in China has a long history and rich sources.21 The most 
influential code22 was promulgated in the Tang dynasty in 624CE. The Chinese 
legal system at this time was one of the five major legal systems in the ancient 
world.23 Chinese law, different from the legal systems of continental Europe, is 
not based on the private-law system of Rome or on any religious background. 
Traditional Chinese law rather focused on state concerns, while private matters 
were of marginal importance. Medieval European monarchs, on the one hand, 
held themselves forth as providers of justice and sought legitimacy on those 
grounds, the Kangxi Emperor24, on the other hand worried that: 
                                                          
19 Jinafu Chen Chinese Law: Context and Transformation (2008) on 10 (hereinafter Chen Context and 
Transformation). 
20 Ibid on 19. 
21 Ibid on 8. 
22 Great Tang Code of CE 624. 
23 Chang A Brief Historical Review. 
24 The Kangxi Emperor was the fourth emperor of the Qing Dynasty from 1661 to 1722. 
9 
‘lawsuits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people were not 
afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of always finding in them 
ready and perfect justice. . . I desire, therefore, that those who have 
recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any pity, and in such 
a manner that they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble to appear 
before a magistrate.’25 
 
In summary, the doctrine of traditional Chinese law inherited by modern China 
is essentially different in many of its most basic principles from European legal 
systems. For example, law has no connection with religion; there is no special, 
separated institution (court) before which disputing parties advance legal 
claims; and, as previously mentioned, the legal system functions to serve state 
interests, not to protect individual rights or to resolve disputes among 
individuals.26 
In the 19th century, China, in the course of the globalization process, was 
facing the biggest challenges the Chinese civilization ever had: the rising 
capitalism and industrialization. The ancient empire reluctantly had to adjust 
itself in order to survive in the modern world.27 Added to this, from 1840 the 
Qing government lost most of the wars and had to sign a series of treaties with 
the Western nations. From 1902 till the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, 
and the beginning of the so called modern China, great efforts were made to 
modernize and improve the Chinese legal system.28 In 1928, China was united 
again under the Nationalist government, and again the law reform became part 
of the agenda of the central government. For the first time in Chinese history, a 
comprehensive modern legal system was established. Like the legislation 
drafted in the late Qing period, the Nationalist legal system followed the Roman 
law model, instead of the Anglo-Saxon system.29 
                                                          
25 Donald C. Clarke The Chinese Legal System (2005), 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dclarke/public/ChineseLegalSystem.html accessed on 14.2.2014 (hereinafter Clarke 
The Chinese Legal System).  
26 Ibid. 




After almost four decades of recurring civil war and invasion, the PRC was 
established in 1949 under the rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC).30 
The CPC represented a totally different ideology from that of the Nationalists. 
Therefore, the legal history of the PRC in 1949 begins with the abolition of all 
the laws of the former state, the Republic of China.31 As a result, a substantial 
legal vacuum that in the end had to be filled by whatever authoritative materials 
decision-makers could use, including Party newspaper editorials, policy 
documents, and leaders' speeches. Apart from that, for a long time there was 
little need for a formal legal system in many areas of national life. The economy 
was largely subject to state planning and conflicts could thus be resolved 
without a proper legal environment of rights and duties.32  
Furthermore in a centrally planned economy, there was not much need for legal 
rules balancing different (private) interests within the society. According to the 
Communist legal theory, the purpose of law is to reflect the will of the ruling 
class, and is therefore a tool of the ruling class to rule other classes. Hence, 
during the first three decades of the Communist rule, law was regarded inferior 
to state or party policies and any substantial development of the legal system 
was prevented.33 
Chinese legal history turned a new page with the start of the post-Mao era of 
economic reform when Deng Xiao Ping stepped into power in 1978. Opening up 
policy and a number of changes began to occur. A large amount of legislation 
was issued and the institutions of the legal system – especially, courts, judges, 
and lawyers – gained a little more centre stage. Indeed, the ideal of rule 
according to law was recently written into the national constitution, however, the 
practical effect of adding these words was small.34 Quite recently, in 2011 the 
People’s Assembly of China declared that a complete modern legal system is 
now in place.35 
                                                          
30 Also called Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
31 Clarke The Chinese Legal System. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Chang A Brief Historical Review. 
34 Clarke The Chinese Legal System. 
35 Chang A Brief Historical Review. 
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3. LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE`S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
The enforcement of law is a complicated sociolegal process which involves 
many institutions and actors and a complex interrelationship between these 
institutions and actors.36 Hence, besides the historical review, it is necessary to 
give an overview through the institutional setting in the PRC, before 
investigating the enforcement of law. The chart37 below shows the structure of 
the Chinese government and its interrelationship to the courts: 
                                                          
36 Chen Implementation of Law in China  –  An Introduction on 5. 
37 King & Wood Mallesons A guide to doing business in the People’s Republic of China (2013), 
http://www.mallesons.com/Documents/A-guide-to-doing-business-in-PRC.EN.pdf accessed on 21.07.2014 




China’s four levels of courts are responsible to the people’s congress (on the 
top the National People’s Congress, NPC) at the equivalent level, which 
formally supervises the courts’ work.38 Each court has a president, a vice 
president, and several judges. Article 11 of the 2001 amended Judges’ Law39 
states that presidents of the people’s courts at various levels are elected or 
removed by the people’s congresses at the corresponding levels, the other 
judges, including the vice-presidents and members of the judicial committees 
                                                          
38 Randall Peerenboom ‘Law enforcement and the legal profession in China’ in China in Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li, Jan 
Michiel Otto (eds) Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China (2002) on 125/126 (hereinafter 
Peerenboom Law enforcement and the legal profession in China). 
39 Judges‘ Law of the People's Republic of China of 1995 (amended 2001) (hereinafter Judges‘ Law). 
13 
shall be appointed or removed by the standing committees of the people’s 
congresses at the corresponding levels upon the suggestions of the presidents 
of those courts.40 The problematic of the local control of personnel and funding 
and its crucial implications for the functioning of the court system will be 
discussed more detailed below.41 
 
3.1 Judicial system 
 
The Constitution of the PRC provides that the PRC is a socialist state under the 
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the 
alliance of workers and peasants, and that the socialist system is the basic 
system of China. Disruption of the socialist system by any organization or 
individual is prohibited.42 Traditionally the courts, together with other judicial 
organs (such as the procuratorates and public security), are weapons of the 
people’s democratic dictatorship.43 However, as the accent mark on the 
socialist market economy has grown, the courts’ task is more and more to 
conduce economic construction. Under Xiao Yang, president of the Supreme 
People's Court (SPC)44 from 1998–2008, the set principles of justice and 
efficiency for courts were the main topics for the Chinese courts and for the 
judicial reform.45 The importance of the leadership of the CPC as well as 
advisory against the imitation of the Western practice of judicial supremacy was 
maintained. Nevertheless, Xiao in general emphasised the necessity of Chinese 
judiciary’s commitment to justice (both substantive and procedural), fairness, 
conscience, openness, and professionalism.46 In late 2008 Shengjun Wang got 
the leadership of the SPC. The result was that there was a shift of policy 
                                                          
40 Weixia Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo Vadis Chinese Courts? (2013), http://cjcl.
oxfordjournals.org/content/1/2/303.full accessed on 10.07.2014 (hereinafter Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Politic
al Transformation). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China of 1982 (amended 2004) art. 1 (hereinafter Constitution of the PRC 
1982). 
43 Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation. 
44 The Supreme People's Court is the highest court in the mainland area of the PRC. 
45 Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation; SPC, Work Report to the National People’s Congress 
2003, http://www.china.org.cn/english/eng-shuzi2003/zz/zz5.htm accessed on 17.07.2014 (hereinafter 2003 SPC 
Report). 
46 Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation. 
14 
regarding the work and orientation of the courts.47 Typical themes in the CPC’s 
tradition of political (rather than neutral or independent) and populist (rather 
than professional) nature were revived. Accordingly to the three supremes48 
and the concept of the socialist rule of law, Wang emphasised the duty of the 
courts to serve the goals and policies determined by the CPC and to take into 
account the overall situation, or circumstances, of the society. Hence, implicitly 
downgrading the importance of a strict adherence to legal rules.49 Wang 
suggested the courts to follow the mass line, serve the needs of the people, 
take public opinion into account, and increase the level of public satisfaction 
and confidence in the work of the judiciary.50 
In March 2014 the recent president of the SPC, Zhou Qiang, made the work 
report to the NPC and stated the following:  
‘In 2013, the Supreme People's Court, under the strong leadership of 
General Secretary Xi Jinping and the Party center, and under the 
supervision of the National People's Congress and its standing 
committee, have tightly centered around the goal of letting the people 
feel fairness and justice from every judicial case, and has adhered to the 
overall service picture, a judiciary for the people and judicial fairness; 
faithfully performing the duties provided by the constitution and laws, and 
making progress in all areas of work… .’51 
 
The Leadership of Zhou Qiang is a step forward as he is a promoter of the 
‘establishment of a peaceful China with the rule of law’52 and judicial 
professionalization. Moreover he makes efforts to make the judiciary more 
transparent and fair. In the work plan for 2014 he stated inter alia: ‘Strictly follow 
the law in performing trial duties, maintaining the uniformity, dignity and 
authority of the nation's legal system, promoting social fairness and justice and 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 The three supremes are: The supremacy of the party leadership, the supremacy of the people’s interest and 
supremacy of the constitution and laws. 
49 Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation; SPC, Work Report to the National People’s Congress 
2009,  http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6610940.html on 17.07.2014 (hereinafter 2009 SPC 
Report). 
50 Ibid. 
51 SPC, Work Report to the National People’s Congress 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-
05/08/content_32331522.htm (hereinafter 2014 SPC Report). 
52 Ibid. 
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guaranteeing the people's ability to live and work in peace and contentment.’53 
Even if some signs bode well, fundamental shifts must be completed before the 
optimism is truly justifiable. 
 
3.1.1  Court system 
Due to the fact that there is no separation of powers in the Chinese government 
system like in Western countries, the court system in China works different from 
that of Western courts.54 The structure of the court system is based on the 
principle of four levels of courts and at most two trials to conclude a case (one 
trial at first instance, one trial on appeal).55 A decision made by an appeal court 
is final, and no appeal thence is allowed (‘two trials and the second one is 
final’).56 There is a hierarchy of the four levels from the top down: The SPC, the 
high people’s courts, the intermediate people’s courts, and the basic people’s 
courts.57 There are also a number of specialized courts, for example military 
courts, maritime courts and railway courts.58 These specialist courts have 
jurisdiction over particular types of disputes.59 The following chart60 shows the 
structure of the courts in the PRC: 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
54 Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the PRC on 30. 
55 A.HY Chen An introduction to the Legal System of the PRC on 137.  
56 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China of 1991 (amended 2012) (hereinafter CPL) art. 10; Zhang. 
57 A Brief Introduction to China, Judicial Branch, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.shtm, accessed on    
11.02.2014 (hereinafter A Brief Introduction to China). 
58 Ibid; A.HY Chen An introduction to the Legal System of the PRC on 138. 
59 Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation. 
60 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c4/Court_system_of_China.gif accessed on 23.04.2014. 
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The SPC has several key functions: It controls the activities of the lower courts 
through its decisions, directives and supervision, it harmonises the application 
of the law with the policies of the Party and not only within the framework of the 
system of legal rules.61 One important task of the SPC is that it exercises a de 
facto62 general normative power. However, the SPC is theoretically only 
authorised to interpret questions of law arising out of specific application.63 But 
actually the SPC issues so called opinions on general matters of interpretation 
of given laws, drafted in the form of general provisions. The problem is that 
without these interpretations, it is practically impossible to enforce national laws 
framed in general and vague terms.64 Lower courts are bound to comply with 
the SPC directives and opinions.65 
                                                          
61 Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the PRC on 30/31. 
62 The Constitution provides that the Standing Committee of the NPC exercises the power to interpret the 
Constitution and the laws. 
63 Jianfu Chen Chinese Law: towards an understanding of Chinese law, its nature, and development (1999) on 
108/109 (hereinafter Chen Towards an Understanding of Chinese law). 
64 Ibid on 109. 
65 Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the PRC on 32. 
17 
According to the Organic Law of the People’s Courts66 the collegial bench for 
first instance cases shall consist either of judges or of judges and people’s 
assessors; simple civil cases, minor criminal cases and cases otherwise 
provided for by law (summary procedure is applied) may be tried by a single 
judge.67 People’s assessors in trials in China, are not required to have a law 
degree, but they have the same rights as judges in adjudicating cases (at least 
in theory).68 The system of people’s assessors is considered to be a reflection 
of the ideal of popular participation in and democratic supervision of the 
administration of justice.69 Decisions are made by the principle of minority 
obeying majority, and dissenting opinions are solely recorded but not included 
in the judgment.70 For second instance trials, cases are dealt with by a panel71 
of odd judges, usually three judges at the intermediate court and at the high 
court and at the SPC by a panel of five judges.72 The trial system for civil 








                                                          
66 Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China of 1979 (amended 1983) (hereinafter Law of 
the People's Courts). 
67 Ibid art. 10; CPL art. 39. 
68 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Improving the System of People's 
Assessors, art. 14; A.HY Chen An introduction to the Legal System of the PRC on 140. 
69 A.HY Chen An introduction to the Legal System of the PRC on 141. 
70 Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the PRC on 42; CPL art. 42. 
71 Collegiate panels consist of at least three judges or a combination of judges and people's assessors. 
72 CPL art. 40, 41. 
73 Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation 
(http://cjcl.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/06/17/cjcl.cxt011/T1.expansion.html). 
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1.             First instance 
 




Cases with major impact on 
the whole country 
Cases that SPC deems it 
should try 
Collegial panel composed of 
judges and judicial assessors 
or of judges alone 
Appeals of cases tried in HPCs 
at first instance 
 
 
Collegial panel  





Cases with major impact on 
the areas under their 
jurisdiction 
Collegial panel composed of 
judges and judicial assessors 
or of judges alone 
Appeals of cases tried in IPCs 
at first instance 
 
Collegial panel 





Major cases involving foreign 
element 
Cases with major impact on 
the area under their jurisdiction 
Cases determined by SPC to 
be under IPC’s jurisdiction 
Collegial panel composed of 
judges and judicial assessors 
or of judges alone 
Appeals of cases tried in BPCs 











Civil cases unless otherwise 
provided 
Summary procedure for simple 
civil cases 
Collegial panel composed of 
judges and judicial assessors 
or of judges alone 
 
Single judge for summary 
procedure 




Collegial panel composed of 
three judges or of judges and 
people’s assessors totalling 
three 
Collegial panel or single judge 
for summary procedure 
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3.1.2  Size and performance of the courts 
The basic people’s courts are composed of more than 3,000 courts at county 
(district) level which are further subdivided74 into approximately 30,000 smaller 
units known as people’s tribunals (renmin fating) located in towns and villages. 
There are hundreds (roughly 400) of intermediate people’s courts in cities and 
prefectures (diqu) within provinces and 31 high people’s courts at provincial 
level, and the SPC.75 There is a relatively large number of judges in the highest 
judiciary in China, with more than 500 judges serving the SPC and 7,000 at the 
31 high people’s courts. Including all of their divisions and tribunals, the 
intermediate people’s courts have approximately 36,000 judges. In regard to the 
thousands of basic level people’s courts, which handle most of the first instance 
civil and criminal trials in China, there are 146,000 judges.76 
The work report of the SPC in March 2014 is the most recent attempt by the 
SPC to illustrate the size and performance of the Chinese courts in a single 
year (including the number of cases, their categories, and the ratios). In 2013 
the SPC heard 11,016 cases of various types, up 3.2 per cent over 2012, and 
concluded 9,716 cases, up 1.6 percent. Local courts at various levels handled 
more than 14,21 million cases of various types, up 7.4 percent over 2012, and 
concluded 12,95 million cases, up 4.4 percent.77 
Courts at all levels concluded 3,957,000 first-instance commercial cases, 
954,000 first instance criminal cases (convicting 1,158 million persons), and 
completing first-instance trial in 121,000 administrative litigation cases.78 Cases 
involving judicial supervision completing trial of 116,000 cases of appeals or 
requests for retrial, and initiating retrial in 30,000 cases and changed judgments 
in 7,415 cases where the original judgment was truly wrong or there were other 
statutory grounds – these account for 0.9 per cent of effective judgments.79 
                                                          
74 Criminal division, civil division, economic division and enforcement division. 
75 A.HY Chen An introduction to the Legal System of the PRC on 137/138. 
76 Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation. 





3.1.3  Prosecution system 
The people’s procuratorates of the PRC are state organs for legal supervision.80 
The procuratorate system reflects in most aspects the court system, such as the 
organizational structure, rules regarding removal and appointment of personnel, 
qualifications and other matters. The Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
accountable to the NPC and its Standing Committee, is the highest 
prosecutorial agency in China exercising and supervising the courts’ judicial 
work and law enforcement.81 Furthermore, they have the authority to intervene 
in civil and administrative cases. They are even in charge of supervising all 
other governmental organs at their corresponding level.82 
3.1.4  Lawyer system 
In the socialist era, PRC lawyers were considered workers of the state. It was 
their task to provide legal advice to government organs, state-owned 
companies, people’s communes, work units and other economic actors in a 
centrally planned economy.83 To put it plainly, they were to protect the interests 
of the state, promote the socialist legal order through all of their activities, and 
remain ever faithful to the cause of socialism.84 But the problem is one cannot 
serve two masters, and lawyers were forced into the untenable position of 
choosing between their obligation to defend the lawful interests of their clients 
and their duty to safeguard the interests of the state and the society.85 
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Lawyers of 199686 still retains 
overtones of socialist rhetoric, socialism as an ideology has little impact today.87  
 
                                                          
80 Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China of 1979 (amended 1983) art. 1 
(hereinafter Law of the People's Procuratorates). 
81 A Brief Introduction to China. 
82 Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the PRC on 36. 
83 Peerenboom Law enforcement and the legal profession in China on131. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers of 1996 (amended 2007) (hereinafter Law on Lawyers). 
87 Peerenboom Law enforcement and the legal profession in China on131. 
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The Law on Lawyers 
‘is enacted in order to improve the system governing lawyers, to ensure 
that lawyers practise according to law, to standardize acts of lawyers, to 
safeguard the lawful rights and interests of parties, to ensure the correct 
implementation of law, and to enable lawyers to play a positive role in the 
development of the socialist legal system.’88 
 
Furthermore art. 2 of the Law on Lawyers, defines lawyers as ‘a practitioner 
who has acquired a lawyer’s practice certificate pursuant to law and provides 
legal services to the public’. Article 3 provides that: 
‘In his legal practice, a lawyer must abide by the Constitution and laws, 
and strictly observe lawyers’ professional ethics as well as discipline 
governing their legal practice. In legal practice, a lawyer must base 
himself on facts and take law as the criterion. In legal practice, a lawyer 
shall subject himself to supervision of the State, society and the parties 
concerned. The legal practice of lawyers according to law shall be 
protected by law. No unit or individual shall infringe the lawful rights and 
interests of lawyers.’ 
 
However, lawyers do not belong to courts or procuratorates, the governmental 
control and supervision on the legal profession is in fact, exercised with 
increasing energy. Consequently, lawyers in practice continue to be subject to a 
variety of pressures from the government (Ministry of Justice) and its local 
branches.89 This can be illustrated by the fact that the Ministry of Justice in 
March 2012 has issued a requirement that lawyers have an obligation to swear 
an oath90 of loyalty to the CPC to be licensed or to have their license renewed.91 
This is clearly a step backwards and lawyers now are even more under 
pressure to fulfil their profession.  
                                                          
88 Law on Lawyers art. 1. 
89 Peerenboom Law enforcement and the legal profession in China on 133. 
90 The core of the oath says: ‘I swear to faithfully fulfil the sacred mission of legal workers in socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. I swear my loyalty to the motherland, to the people, to uphold the leadership of the Communist Party 
of China and the socialist system, and to protect the dignity of the Constitution and laws.’ 
91 Castellucci Rule of law and legal complexity in the PRC on 45. 
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3.1.5  Jurisdiction 
As in the Western concept of the rule of law jurisdiction is a neutral, technical 
procedure, in the PRC jurisdiction depends on the territorial impact. That 
means, that according to the general impact of the case, a court from a higher 
or lower level has jurisdiction. In Western countries this is a clear violation of the 
due process, because it is not foreseeable which court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction.92 Cases in international civil litigation normally begin at the 
intermediate level because of their potential significant impact. The SPC stated 
in its Opinions: ‘The "major cases involving foreign elements" as prescribed in 
Article 19 (a) of the Civil Procedure Law, refers to the cases involving foreign 
elements in which the sum of disputed subject matter is large, the case is 
complex, or the number of the parties concerned residing at abroad is large.93 
 
3.2 Impact on the enforcement 
The whole structure of the legal system in the PRC leads to the fact that the 
implementation of law is more often seen as a political game than as a legal 
issue.94 The complicated process of implementation of law is in China even 
more complex. The main reason therefore is, as noted previously, the lack of 
separation of powers. The boundaries between the three branches are fuzzy 
and far from clear. Among the three branches of state powers, the judiciary is 
neither the exclusive nor the principal dispute arbitrator, nor even the final 
arbitrator in dispute settlement.95 And of course apart from the three authorities 
the CPC, though not a constitutional authority, is the de facto96 supreme 
power.97 The low level of legal consciousness among citizens has to be taken in 
consideration. Many of them on the one hand are unaware of their rights, on the 
other hand, even when citizens do know their rights, they are often reluctant to 
                                                          
92 Ibid on 32/33. 
93 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil Procedure Law 
of the People's Republic of China of 1992 (hereinafter Opinions of the SPC 1992). 
94 Chen Context and Transformation on 654. 
95 Ibid on 655. 
96 The National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee exercise the legislative power of the State 
(Constitution of the PRC 1982 art. 58.) 
97 Chen Context and Transformation on 655. 
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start litigation.98 Although these facts influence and hamper the implementation 
of law, it would be inaccurate to assert that there is no implementation 
(enforcement) of law in the PRC at all. 
 
4. THE ORGANIZATION OF ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEDURE 
In this part, inter alia, the most important measures and provisions of law 
enforcement will be mentioned. 
 
4.1  Procedure 
The main source is the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC of 1991 (amended 
2012) (CPL), which incorporates the procedure of enforcement of court and 
arbitration decisions. In Part Three the Procedure of Enforcement is regulated 
and divided in General Provisions, Application and Referral of Enforcement, 
Enforcement Measures, Suspension and Termination of Enforcement. In the 
general provisions, for example, is stated that ‘legally effective judgments or 
rulings of civil cases … shall be enforced by the people's court of first 
instance…’.99 Furthermore that ‘the enforcement shall be carried out by the 
enforcement officer’100 and ‘the people's court shall review the written objection 
within 15 days after receiving it.101 ‘If the people’s court fails to make 
enforcement within six months after receiving the application for enforcement, 
the person who has applied for the enforcement may apply for enforcement to 
the people’s court at the next higher level’.102 Part Four contains the Special 
Provisions of the Civil Procedures Involving Foreign Elements. Article 263 of the 
CPL provides ‘when foreign nationals, stateless persons, or foreign enterprises 
or organizations need to appoint lawyers for filing or respond to a lawsuit in a 
people’s court, they shall appoint the lawyers of the People’s Republic of China 
only.’ Hence, if lawyers are engaged in the application for enforcement of a 
foreign judgment or arbitral award, a lawyer from the PRC has to be appointed. 
                                                          
98 Peerenboom Law enforcement and the legal profession in China in China on 125/126. 
99 CPL art. 224. 
100 Ibid art. 228. 
101 Ibid art. 225. 
102 Ibid art. 226. 
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4.2.  Measures of enforcement 
In art. 241–255 of the CPL the measures of enforcement are regulated.103 The 
most important are the following:  
The people’s court shall have the power  
– to impose a fine or detention104 
– to make inquiries, such as savings, bonds, stocks and funds, and may 
seize, freeze, transfer or appraise his property according to the 
situation105 
– to withhold or withdraw the portion of the income to fulfil his 
obligation106 
– to seize, detain, freeze, auction, or sell the portion of his property107 
– to issue a search warrant and search his domicile or the place where 
the property may be concealed.108 
 
4.3.  Relevant provisions on law enforcement 
Some of the most relevant provisions on law enforcement are: 
 
– Administrative Procedure Law of the PRC (1989).109 
– CPL (1991) 
– Opinions of the SPC (1992) 
– Interpretation of the SPC of Several Issues concerning the      
Enforcement Procedures in the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of 
                                                          
103 Jiang Court Delay and Law Enforcement on 199. 
104 CPL art. 241. 
105 Ibid art. 242. 
106 Ibid art. 243. 
107 Ibid art. 244. 
108 Ibid art. 248. 
109 Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China of 1989. 
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the PRC (2009).110 
 
The implementation of international law in the PRC can be divided in three 
categories: national legislation111, judicial judgments112 and administrative 
regulations. In regard to the implementation of international law, especially 
administrative regulations and rules are essential means to enforce 
international law in China. These provisions perform the functions and 
responsibility of administrative organs in the implementations of international 
law.113 
 
5. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN THE PEOPLE’S COURTS OF 
CHINA 
With regard to the enforcement of judgments in international litigations, 
especially civil litigation, there are two aspects which have to be considered. 
The first aspect concerns recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, 
and the second is to enforce the judgment entered by a domestic court of the 
country.114 
 
5.1  Enforcement of foreign judgments in the people’s courts 
In simplified terms, there are three channels available to enforce a foreign 
judgment in China: the domestic rules-based, the bilateral treaties-based and 
the multi-lateral conventions-based.115 Due to the fact that the existing Sino-
foreign bilateral treaties in the respect of the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments are still limited to just a few countries, and China’s accession 
                                                          
110 The Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Several Issues concerning the Enforcement Procedures in 
the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China of 2009 (hereinafter Interpretation of the 
SPC 2009). 
111 Some international conventions ratified by China stipulate the duty of contracting parties to adopt legislative 
measures. 
112 Moreover, some conventions ratified by China stipulated obligations regarding jurisdiction and proceedings, 
China used domestic courts to fulfil this duty. 
113 Shao The theory and practice of the implementation of international law in China on 203. 
114 M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China  on 85. 
115 Wenliang Zhang Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China: A Call for Special Attention to 
Both the “Due Service Requirement” and the “Principle of Reciprocity” (2013) on 149, 
http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/1/143.abstract accessed on 30.7.2014 (hereinafter W. Zhang 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China). 
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to international conventions concerning this matter is also exceptional, the first 
channel is of predominant significance.116 For this reason, the focus is set on 
the relevant Chinese domestic rules. 
The articles which relate to the process to enforce foreign judgments by the 
people’s court are art. 281 and 282 of the CPL.117 Moreover, the in 1992 issued 
Opinions of the SPC118, make specific provisions on the application of the CPL 
in regard of the enforcement of foreign judgments.119 There are two ways to 
start the litigation: On the one hand the foreign judgment creditor may directly 
apply for recognition and enforcement to the competent (intermediate)120 
people's court for recognition and enforcement of the judgment, or on the other 
hand the foreign court may request a judgment recognition and enforcement to 
the competent people’s court.121 It should be mentioned, that the foreign court 
request in this regard has to be directed to the competent people’s court 
through the means provided in the treaties to which China and the foreign 
country have joined, or on the basis of reciprocity. If the parties do not have a 
treaty and reciprocity does not exist the foreign court may request assistance 
through diplomatic means.122  
                                                          
116 Ibid on 149. 
117 Article 281 If a legally effective judgment or ruling made by a foreign court seeks the recognition and 
enforcement of a people’s court of the People’s Republic of China, the party may directly apply to the intermediate 
people’s court of the People’s Republic of China that has the jurisdiction over the case for the recognition and 
enforcement, or the foreign court may, according to the provisions of the international treaties concluded or acceded 
to by the People’s Republic of China or based on the principle of reciprocity, request the recognition and enforcement 
of a people’s court. 
Article 282 After a people’s court of the People’s Republic of China reviews an application or pleading for the 
recognition and enforcement of a legally effective judgment or ruling rendered by a foreign court according to the 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or based on the principle of reciprocity, 
if the court considers that such a judgment or ruling does not contradict the basic principles of the laws of the People’s 
Republic of China nor violates the national, social, and public interest of China, the court may render a ruling to 
recognize its force. Where the enforcement is necessary, the court may issue an order to enforce a foreign judgment 
according to the relevant provisions of this Law. If a legally effective judgment or ruling rendered by a foreign court 
contradicts the basic principles of the law of the People’s Republic of China or the national, social, and public interest 
of China, the people’s court shall reject the application of recognition and enforcement. 
118 Opinions of the SPC 1992. 
119 For example its articles 306, 318 and 319 amended articles 281 and 282 of the CPL. 
120 For purposes of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, the competent court shall be the 
intermediate people’s court of the place where the judgment debtor resides or his property is located (Opinions of the 
SPC 1992, XVIII). 
121 CPL art. 281, 282; Zhang Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China on 87. 
122 Ibid. 
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Upon the acknowledgement of the judgment recognition and enforcement 
petition or request, the intermediate people’s court shall examine and review 
the foreign judgment on the basis of relevant national law of China, international 
treaties that China has acceded to or concluded, and the principle of 
reciprocity.123 Furthermore, the principle of the priority application of 
international treaties should receive attention.124 The examination and review, 
however, is limited to the formality of the foreign judgment without regarding the 
substantive law (findings of facts and application of law) of the foreign court’s 
decision.125 After the examination and review, a people’s court shall reject the 
application of recognition and enforcement if a legally effective judgment or 
ruling rendered by a foreign court contradicts the basic principles of Chinese 
law or violates China’s national, social, and public interests.126 Otherwise, 
where the enforcement is necessary, the court may issue an order to enforce a 
foreign judgment according to the relevant provisions to the CPL (enforcement 
measures).127 
Although the CPL does not mention the conditions under which a people’s court 
may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment in detail, in practice, 
the people’s courts may strike down a petition or request if one of the following 
conditions is met: 
‘– according to Chinese law, the court that made the judgment shall have 
the jurisdiction over the case; 
– according to the law of the country in which the judgment was made, 
the judgment has become effective; 
– the lawful rights and interests of the litigants have been and are duly 
protected; 
– Chinese courts have already arrived at a legally effective judgment on 
a case with the same litigants and the identical object of action; or the 
case is being heard by the Chinese courts; or the Chinese courts have 
recognized the judgment of a court of a third country and the judgment 
has become legally effective; and 
– the judgment is in conformity with the principles of Chinese law and 
                                                          
123 Shao The theory and practice of the implementation of international law in China on 208; CLP art. 282. 
124 Ibid. 
125 M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 88. 
126 Shao The theory and practice of the implementation of international law in China on 208; CLP art. 282. 
127 Ibid. 
28 
does not impair the Chinese sovereignty and security nor the Chinese 
social and public interest.’128 
  
5.2  Enforcement of (domestic) judgments in the people’s courts 
In the CPL are a number of devices noticed by which a people’s court judgment 
may be enforced.129 In the main, the enforcement is divided into enforcement 
against property (called execution), and enforcement against required activities 
(‘The object of compulsory enforcement shall be a property or act’130). As stated 
above, the available measures for enforcement include inspection, freezing, 
and transfer of judgment debtor’s deposits, withholding and withdrawal of 
judgment debtor’s income, sequestration, seizure, freezing, public auction, and 
sale of judgment debtor’s property; and eviction and return of land.131 
The enforcement against required activities involves forced delivery of specified 
value instruments or certificates and forced performance of acts as specified in 
the judgment. Additionally, for purposes of enforcing judgments, the CPL also 
provides certain protective measures, which include search, issuance of 
certificates for the transfer of property rights, as well as monetary penalties for 
delayed payment.132 
There are two ways to start the process of enforcement in the people’s courts. 
The more common one is the enforcement by mandate (petition) made by the 
judgment creditor.133 If the judgment debtor refuses to satisfy the people’s court 
judgment, the judgment creditor may apply to the people's court for 
enforcement.134 ‘For the enforcement by mandate, the entrusted people's court 
shall issue a power of attorney and the effective legal document (duplicate). 
The power of attorney shall contain a definite request for the enforcement.’135 It 
is also required that the petitioner provide information about the financial status 
                                                          
128 M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 88. 
129 Opinions of the SPC 1992, XVII, 254; M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 85. 
130 Ibid. 
131 CPL art. 241-244; M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 85. 
132 CPL XXII Execution Measures, art. 241-255; M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 85. 
133 CPL art. 236; M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 86. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Opinions of the SPC 1992, 260. 
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and property of the judgment debtor.136 The time limit for the submission of an 
application for enforcement shall be now two years.137 The former art. 219 of 
the CPL, which provided ‘the time limit for the judgment enforcement petition, is 
one year, if at least one party is citizen, or six months, if all parties are legal 
persons or other organizations’, does not apply anymore. 
The other way is the so called judge-referred enforcement.138 Here the 
enforcement of the case is triggered by referral of the judge. The judge-referred 
enforcement is limited to conciliation statement and other legal documents that 
are to be executed by the people's court.139 The SPC adopted in the year 1998 
the ‘Rules (Provisional) on Several Matters Concerning Enforcement Work in 
the People’s Courts.’140 Under these Rules, a judge may refer for enforcement:  
 
‘– judgments for child support, alimony, pension, medical expenses, and 
salaries;  
– legal documents made by the people’s courts in criminal proceedings 
containing property-related civil judgments, orders, and mediation 
papers;  
– court orders pertaining to attachment and advance execution;  
– court decisions on fines and detention; and  
– civil judgments and orders made by the people’s court concerning 
major interests of China.’141 
 
In the people’s courts, enforcement of a judgment shall be carried out by an 
enforcement officer. The basic people's court and the intermediate people's 
court may, when necessary, establish execution organs (division), whose 
functions shall be defined by the SPC in charge of judgment execution.142 ‘The 
execution officer shall, upon receiving the application for execution or the writ of 
                                                          
136 The Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Several Issues concerning the Enforcement Procedures in 
the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China of 2009 (hereinafter Announcement of the 
SPC 2009), art. 32. 
137 CPL art. 239; M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 86. 
138 CPL art. 239. 
139 Ibid ; M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 86. 
140 Supreme People’s Court, Rules (Provisional) on Several Matters Concerning Enforcement Work in the People’s 
Courts (1998). 
141 Ibid art. 92; M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 86. 
142 CPL art. 228; M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 87. 
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referral directing execution, send an execution notice to the person subject to 
execution and may carry out compulsory execution immediately.’143 
If the judgment creditor applies for enforcement of a legally effective judgment 
or written order made by a people's court, and the judgment debtor or his 
property is not within the territory of the PRC, the applicant may directly apply 
for recognition and enforcement to the foreign court which has jurisdiction. The 
people's court may also, in accordance with the provisions of bilateral or 
international treaties to which both China and the foreign country are members, 
or with the principle of reciprocity (in absence of these treaties), request 
recognition and enforcement by the foreign court.144 
 
6. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN THE CHINESE 
PEOPLE’S COURTS 
Especially, in China arbitration is an important alternative form of resolving civil 
and economic disputes. The reason why the Chinese prefer to seek dispute 
resolution through negotiation, mediation and arbitration instead of litigation 
has, at least, three sources: Confucian philosophy, the unavailability and 
inadequacy of the court system, and a social structure that emphasized small, 
stable units.145 Thus, particularly of the Confucianism, Chinese business men 
favour friendly negotiation, mediation and arbitration, which differ from the 
Western tradition of litigation.146 
 
6.1  Arbitration system 
Arbitration is a legal agreement whereby both parties to a civil (commercial) 
dispute reach an arrangement to voluntarily submit the case to a third party to 
adjudicate in accordance with specified procedures and rules and following the 
principle of impartiality, and whereby both parties are bound to enforce the 
                                                          
143 CPL art. 220. 
144 Ibid art. 280. 
145 Tanya Kozak International Commercial Arbitration/Mediation at CIETAC (China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission) (1998), http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/hosted/17451-
international_commercial_arb.pdf accessed on 03.05.2014.  
146 Ibid. 
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ruling. Arbitration is usually a trade activity without governmental interference, 
hence a private action. Together with composition, mediation and action, it is a 
common way to settle civil (commercial) disputes. Arbitration, however, is 
subject to state supervision in the PRC. The state intervenes through courts in 
conformity with legal provisions of the place where the arbitration takes place in 
the validity of the arbitration award, the making of arbitration procedures, the 
enforcement of awards and in the case of involuntary enforcement by a party. 
Arbitration, hence, is a judicial activity and a part of China's judicial regime.147 
In the PRC there are basically two separate systems of arbitration, one for 
domestic economic cases and the other for cases involving foreign elements.148 
The arbitration system consists primarily of the China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), the China Maritime Arbitration 
Commission (CMAC), and the more than 140 local arbitration commissions set 
up in large- and medium-sized cities throughout China.149 The CIETAC is the 
only arbitration agency in China that handles international economic and trade 
disputes. It is headquartered in Beijing, with branch offices in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai150, Tianjin and Chongqing.151 
The China Arbitration Association (CAA) is a social organization with the status 
of a legal person. The arbitration commissions are members of China 
Arbitration Association.152 In keeping with the transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a more market-oriented one, art. 14 of the Arbitration Law 
stipulates: ‘Arbitration commissions shall be independent from administrative 
                                                          
147 Arbitration System, http://www.lawinfochina.com/legal/Display_5.shtm accessed on 13.02.1014; CPL art. 271-
275. 
148 A.HY Chen An introduction to the Legal System of the PRC on 223. 
149 Randall Peerenboom The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 
(2000) http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_01.2_peerenboom.pdf  accessed on 29.07.2014 (hereinafter 
Peerenboom Arbitral Awards). 
150 In regard of the sub-commissions of Shanghai and Shenzhen an important implication has to be made: After the 
release in 2012 of its new arbitration rules, CIETAC has undergone a number of internal changes.  
The CIETAC Shanghai Sub-Commission has renamed itself the Shanghai International Arbitration Centre (“SHIAC”) 
and the CIETAC Shenzhen Sub-Commission has renamed itself the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration 
(“SCIA”). Both have adopted their own arbitration rules and arbitrator panels. While, CIETAC has announced that 
parties which have agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration by one of the former sub-commissions should submit 
any request for arbitration to CIETAC in Beijing. In order to avoid inconvenience and uncertainty, if the parties decide 
to arbitrate in China, they should provide for CIETAC rather than by one of its sub-commissions. 
151 China’s Judiciary, Arbitration System, http://www.china.org.cn/english/Judiciary/31276.htm accessed on 
13.02.2014. 
152 Arbitration Law of thePeople's Republic of China of 1994, art.15 (hereinafter Arbitration Law). 
32 
organs and there shall be no subordinate relationships between arbitration 
commissions and administrative organs. There shall also be no subordinate 
relationships between arbitration commissions’. 
 
6.2  Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards153 
The enforcement of arbitral awards is of a greater ease than the enforcement of 
foreign judgments in the PRC. 
 
6.2.1  Laws 
There are quite a lot laws and regulations concerning the enforcement of 
arbitral awards in China. The following are some of the more important ones: 
– Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (1958) (New York Convention)154 
– Arbitration Law (1994) 
– CPL (1991) 
– Interpretation by the SPC on Certain Issues relating to Application of 
the Arbitration Law of the PRC (2006)155 
 
6.2.2.  Categories of arbitration awards 
Arbitral awards, according to the CPL and the Arbitration Law, can be divided 
into three different categories for the purpose of enforcement in China: Foreign 
arbitral awards (art 283 CPL), foreign-related arbitral awards (art. 272 CPL) and 
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domestic arbitral awards (art. 237 CPL).156 The categorization is relevant in 
determining which enforcement regime applies and therefore the grounds 
available for refusing enforcement.157 
Arbitral awards made outside of China (or arbitral awards made in China in the 
course of an international arbitral institution) are all considered foreign arbitral 
awards.158 
A foreign-related arbitral award is an award made in China.  It has to be made 
in an arbitration which is administered by a Chinese arbitration institution and 
has any of the following foreign elements:  
– At least one party to the arbitration is a foreign party.   
– The legal facts as to the establishment, modification and termination of the 
legal relationship between the parties happened outside China; or 
– The subject matter of the arbitration is located outside China.159   
A domestic arbitral award, unsurprisingly, is an award made in China. The 
arbitration proceedings are under the administration of an arbitration institution 
established in China and do not involve any foreign element.160 
6.2.3  Institutional arbitration 
Furthermore, it also should be mentioned that there is no ad hoc arbitration in 
the PRC for domestic and foreign-related cases, but foreign ad hoc arbitration 
awards can be recognised and enforced in the PRC as a result of the New York 
Convention161.162 In an institutional arbitration system a specialised institution 
(for example the International Chamber of Commerce, ICC) intervenes and 
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takes on the role of administering the arbitration process. Each institution has its 
own set of rules and its own form of administration to assist in the process.163 
An ad hoc arbitration on the other hand is not administered by an institution. 
Hence, the parties will have to determine all aspects of the arbitration 
themselves (the number of arbitrators, appointing those arbitrators, the 
applicable law and the procedure for conducting the arbitration).164 
 
6.2.4  Enforcing foreign arbitration awards in China 
The competent court is ‘the intermediate people's court of the place where the 
party subjected to enforcement has his domicile or where his property is 
located. The people's court shall deal with the matter in accordance with the 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of 
China or with the principle of reciprocity.’165 Foreign arbitral awards must be 
submitted to a Chinese court for enforcement within 2 years of the award being 
issued.166 To apply for the enforcement of a foreign award the requirements are 
to file an application and to provide either the original or a certified copy of the 
award and arbitration agreement, with Chinese translations thereof that have 
been verified by a PRC embassy or consulate, or a notary public in the PRC.167 
The New York Convention specifies the grounds for refusal of enforcement in its 
art. 5:    
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the 
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party 
furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and 
enforcement is sought, proof that: 
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(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, 
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the 
said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties 
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law 
of the country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given 
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his 
case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that 
part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the 
law of the country where the arbitration took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has 
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused 
if the competent authority in the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary 
to the public policy of that country.168 
In 1995 the SPC issued a reporting system to encourage intermediate people’s 
courts to enforce foreign arbitral awards. If the intermediate people’s court 
intends to refuse the enforcement, it is required to report this to the high 
people’s court in the local province. If the high people’s court reviews that 
decision and agrees with the intermediate people’s courts that recognition 
should be refused, it is required to report that decision to the SPC for review. 
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Thus, Chinese lower courts are comprehensible cautious to refuse to recognize 
a foreign arbitral award. 169 
 
6.2.5  Enforcing foreign-related awards in China 
Article 274 of the CPL stipulates the grounds (partly very similar to the grounds 
discussed above) upon which a people's court shall make a written order not to 
allow the enforcement of the award rendered by an arbitral organ of the PRC 
handling cases involving foreign element. The Court may disallow the 
enforcement if: 
‘(1) The parties have not stipulated any clause regarding arbitration in 
their contract or have not subsequently reached a written agreement on 
arbitration;  
(2) The defendant is not duly notified of the appointment of the arbitrators 
or the arbitration proceeding, or the defendant fails to express his 
defense due to the reasons for which he is not held responsible;  
(3) The formation of the arbitration panel or the arbitration procedure is 
not in conformity with rules of arbitration; or  
(4) The matters decided by arbitration exceed the scope of the arbitration 
agreement or the authority of the arbitration institution.  
If the people's court determines that the enforcement of the award goes 
against the social and public interest of the country, the people's court 
shall make a written order not to allow the enforcement of the arbitral 
award.’170 
6.2.6  Enforcing domestic awards in China 
If a party fails to comply with an award made by an arbitration institution that 
was established according to law, the other party may apply for enforcement to 
the people’s court which has jurisdiction over the case. The applied people’s 
court shall enforce the award.171 The enforcement of domestic awards can only 
be revoked by the enforcing court because of the following circumstances:  
                                                          
169 Mun Enforcing arbitral awards in China. 
170 CPL art. 274. 
171 Ibid art. 237. 
37 
(1) Where the parties have not stipulated an arbitration clause in the 
contract or have not subsequently reached a written agreement on 
arbitration;  
(2) Where the matters being arbitrated exceed the scope of the 
arbitration agreement or the authority of the arbitration agency;  
(3) Where the formation of an arbitration tribunal or the procedure of 
arbitration is not in conformity with the legal procedure;  
(4) The evidence based on which the arbitral award is made is falsified;  
(5) The other parties conceal the evidence from the arbitral organ and is 
sufficient to affect the impartiality of the arbitral award; or  
(6) Where the arbitrators involved in any of conducts of embezzlement, 
bribery, practicing favoritism for himself or relatives, twisting the law in 
rendering arbitration award.172 
Furthermore, a people's court, can refuse to enforce a domestic award where it 
determines that the enforcement of the arbitral award would contradict the 
social and public interest.173 
 
6.3 Law enforcement in China numerical  
The chart174 below shows the total number of judgments (and arbitral awards) 





Civil Economic Administrative 
2,639.066 127.977 844.723 28.811 
 
                                                          
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Law Yearbook of China 2000. 
38 
 
Criminal Administrative – 
non-litigation 
Arbitral others 
63.344 361.961 43.160 25.090 
 
Compared to this the total number of judgments enforced in 2013 increased. In 
2013 courts of all levels accepted 2,989 million enforcement cases, and 
completed enforcement in 2,718 case, respective increases of 14 per cent and 
10 per cent (compared to 2012), and of these, 21.000 completed cases were 
long pending cases involving party or government organs. The total amount of 
enforced judgements was 2.56 billion yuan (415,94 million U.S. dollars, 
22.08.2014).175 Thus, in 2013 around 80.000 cases more were totally enforced 
compared to the year 2000. This shows in numbers that there is at least a 
positive development in law enforcement. But still, in a time period of almost 15 
years, the increase is not that tremendous.  
 
7.  CHALLENGES FACING THE CHINESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
The statistic above shows that the enforcement of court judgments and arbitral 
awards in the PRC is still difficult, each year a considerable number is not 
enforced. The difficulties in enforcing judgments and rulings were already 
identified in the early years of the PRC. Clarified by the following statement from 
1953: 
 
‘According to reports from all regions of North China, there is a great 
accumulation of unexecuted cases at the level of the court of first 
instance. …In some of the cases, it has been two or three years since 
judgment; in some, the party frequently runs to the court to apply for 
execution but the problem is not resolved; in some, the party asks, “Is 
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there any law in the court?” and “Does the judgment count for 
anything”.’176 
 
However, especially the SPC has the clear aim of improving the implementation 
of law in terms of both strengthening the law enforcement apparatus and 
providing practical procedural rules,177 the result still is far from optimal. 
Nevertheless, China continues to improve its judiciary, there remain factors, 
which make the enforcement difficult. The long duration of processing cases, 
the lack of professional judges, the different quality of law enforcement 
depending on the area, and the influence of local politics and social pressures 
over judicial decisions are just some of them. Unsurprisingly, on the one hand 
many Chinese describe court judgments and rulings as rubber legal documents 
and many courts, on the other hand, describe enforcement as their number one 
headache.178 
 
7.1  Language barrier 
One real practical concern is the language barrier. If a foreign judgment shall be 
enforced in the PRC it has to be translated into Chinese. Any mistranslations 
are on the part of the judgment creditor. Hence, the judgment debtor can deny 
the judgment for this reason.179 
 
7.2  Lack of information 
Another factor is a lack of information. In many cases, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to get information about the judgment debtor’s financial and asset 
situation, especially for a foreign judgment creditor.180 As described above, a 
request for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment shall be enforced 
by the people's court of the place where the person subjected to execution has 
his domicile or where the property subject to enforcement is located.181 If the 
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judgment debtor disappears to avoid the enforcement and in addition to it 
transfers his assert to an unrevealed place, the judgment creditor has almost no 
opportunities to enforce the judgment.182  
The system of supervisory measures against the secret transfer assets by 
debtors is weak. In particular, it is problematic that some debtors have several 
bank accounts and they often use private accounts to evade inquiry, or transfer 
cash.183 This problem is intensified by the fact that some companies have no 
fixed offices and the authorities do not have effective administration in respects 
to company registration, company profiles, and activities of the company.184 
 
7.3  Lack of court organization and cooperation 
It is a fact that courts do not treat the enforcement as a priority, but instead 
focus on trial activities.185 Article 228 of the CPL stipulates that ‘the enforcement 
shall be carried out by the enforcement officer. The people’s court may, when 
necessary, establish executive organs’. Hence, the establishment of an 
executive organ within the court is seen as an option. As a result, the 
organization of law enforcement differs from court to court. Some courts have 
executive organs, but in many courts, judges who adjudicate still have to 
enforce the court decisions.186 
Moreover, the courts lack good cooperation and coordination due to their loose 
connection with each other. Especially, that higher courts do not have effective 
supervision measures to improve the work in the lower courts, is problematic.187 
Lower courts often abuse their discretion. For example, when recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are requested, lower Chinese courts 
often arbitrarily decide to suspend the awards or refuse the enforcement. In 
order to bridle this practice, the previously mentioned reporting system was 
established, under which the SPC finally decides if an international arbitral 
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award is valid or not.188 The reasons given include the violation of public 
interest and defects in procedure.189 
 
7.4  Rough legislation and regulations 
Another big obstacle of the enforcement of law is the more general problem of 
the rough legislation and regulations, which cannot meet the current situation in 
the PRC.190 On the one hand, the legislation is not detailed enough and too 
vague, hence it causes differences in understanding and interpretations in 
practice. The consequence of rough and vague laws is that courts lack the 
necessity and tough measures to cope with renunciation of debts, escape from 
liability in the form of transfer and concealment of property.191 Furthermore, the 
law does not impose tough sanctions on those debtors who do not comply with 
the measures taken. On the other hand, there are still many gaps in the 
legislation and regulations with regard to law enforcement. Thus, it is quite 
difficult to find accurate answers in the current legislation and in judicial 
interpretations.192 
 
7.5  Legal education (low level of professionalism) 
Depending on the local government and the CPC committees, courts have 
been seen as Party-state organs and judges as government administrators or 
bureaucrats,193 thus, as part of the cadres of the state.194 Until the enactment of 
the Judges’ Law in 1995, judges in China even were not recognised as legal 
professionals. The promulgation of the Judges’ Law was a great shift to the 
institutionalization and professionalization of Chinese judges. Before, in the 
early 1980s, approximately two-thirds of Chinese judges did not have a law 
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degree.195 Judicial personnel now have to pass the unified196 national judicial 
exam to get qualified (which was reflected in the amended Judges’ Law in 
2001). Furthermore, one-to-three years197 of working experience in a Chinese 
court after obtaining a law degree or a non-law degree is required.198 
Nevertheless, especially the education of judges on commercial law practices is 
still insufficient. In general, Chinese judges have limited knowledge of modern 
standards of commercial arbitration, a fortiori with regard to the international 
practice of reviewing the effect of international arbitration awards.199 Hence, 
local judges sometimes mistakenly apply legal principles and rules. As a result, 
applicable law rules were often ignored by Chinese local judges when they 
were determining the validity of foreign-related contracts. Another 
consequence, this lack of knowledge has caused is that some foreign arbitral 
awards were set aside or enforcement was denied.200 
The education of the judicial personnel also depends on the area in China. 
Judges in coastal areas (economically well-developed areas) are more 
competent, and they take a more liberal approach in interpreting contracts and 
agreements. By contrast, judges in rural areas, are often not skilled to handle 
complicated commercial cases.201 This unbalanced qualification of judicial 
personnel especially leads to uncertainty about the judicial enforcement in 
different areas of China.202 
One important obstacle to professionalization is that many lawyers find it easier 
and often more effective to rely on personal relations and connections, rather 
than on legal analysis and arguments, to achieve their goals. But at this point it 
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must be noted that such connections are unfortunately often needed to obtain 
information and approvals from the various ministries or to prevail in litigation.203 
 
7.6  Lack of judicial independence 
A major problem that particularly affects international civil litigation, and hence 
the enforcement in China, is the lack of judicial independence. Nevertheless, 
judicial independence is a recognized principle in the Constitution of the PRC 
(and laws). Already in the year 1954, when the first Constitution was adopted it 
provided that ‘the people’s courts administer justice independently and are 
subject only to the law’.204 The current Constitution, adopted in 1982 (amended 
2004), further provides that ‘the people’s courts exercise judicial power 
independently, in accordance with the provisions of law, and not subject to 
interference by any administrative organ, public organization or individual’.205 
Hence, theoretically the Constitution gives the people’s courts the power to act 
independently, but indeed there is no judicial independence.206 
 One reason is the interaction of the institutions. The NPC as the highest organ 
of state power207 is under the direct leadership of the CPC208 and authorised 
with four kinds of constitutional powers: the powers of legislation, of decision 
making for essential issues, of selection and recall, and of supervision.209 The 
power of supervision is the crucial point, because it enables the legislatures to 
be involved in the implementation of law.210 The implementation of the power 
contains, for instance, the interpretation of law, the inspection of selected laws, 
and the supervision of the work of the administrative and judicial organs. 
Especially, the power to interpret the law is clearly against the basic principles 
of the separation of powers and thus has the potential to interfere with judicial 
independence.211 Another point which raises even more serious concerns about 
                                                          
203 Peerenboom  Law enforcement and the legal profession in China in China on 138. 
204 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1954 art. 78 (hereinafter Constitution of the PRC 1954). 
205 Constitution of the PRC 1982 art. 126. 
206 M. Zhang International Civil Litigation in China on 93. 
207 Constitution of the PRC 1982 art. 57. 
208 Ibid art. 58-60. 




the judicial independence, is the attempt by the legislatures to supervise 
individual cases handled by the judiciary.212  Moreover, the SPC codified as the 
highest judicial organ, is required to report to the NPC.213 As a result, even the 
SPC’s actions are influenced by the Party. 
The four level system, from the SPC to the basic people’s courts is one factor 
which hinders an efficient judicial adjunction and enforcement. In particular, that 
the judges from lower courts are appointed by the local people’s congress214, 
which is tremendous influenced by the local communist party, makes judicial 
independence almost impossible. Furthermore, the fact that the lower people’s 
courts are responsible to the local people’s congresses at the corresponding 
level215 (Judges of the basic people’s courts, are beholden to the county-level 
government, the high court judges are beholden to the provincial-level 
government, and SPC judges are beholden to the central government216). 
Another fact is, that Chinese judges are not appointed for a life term and thus 
have no security of tenure.217 The consequence is, to avoid to be removed, they 
rather follow the directives of the local government. 
 
7.7  Local protectionism 
There is a smooth transition from the lack of judicial independence to local 
protectionism, thus, the boundaries are blurred. Local protectionism, is one of 
the main obstacles to a proper law enforcement in the PRC. The ongoing 
economic change from a centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented 
one gives rise to a host of enforcement problems. Economic reforms lead more 
and more to central-local tensions, and forced many local governments to fend 
for themselves, resulting in widespread local protectionism.218 One reason for 
local protectionism, (and the lack of judicial independence), is the way local 
                                                          
212 Ibid. 
213 Constitution of the PRC 1982 art. 127,128. 
214 And not by the central government. 
215 Ibid art. 95-11; Chen Context and Transformation on 151. 
216 Gu The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation. 
217 Judges’ Law art.11. 
218 Peerenboom Law enforcement and the legal profession in China on 126. 
45 
people’s courts are funded.219 Courts in China are funded by governments at 
their corresponding levels. However, the SPC supervises the adjudicative work 
of all lower-level people’s courts, it has no power over their budgets.220 Local 
courts depend on local governments for their most basic necessities such as 
salaries, housing and benefits.221 On the other hand, local governments also 
need to support themselves (and their local courts) through local taxes, fees, 
and charges collected from local businesses.222 
As a consequence, unconventional incentives were allocated to the courts to 
lean on local businesses. Where state-owned enterprises or government-
supported businesses are stakeholders (local governments, quite often, own 
the local industry as well as the local court at least in a political sense)223, the 
local court is more likely to seize jurisdiction over a case and refuse to refer 
parties to litigation outside the local jurisdiction.224 This government interference 
in favour of state-owned enterprises is a great problem. Local courts decide 
cases or enforce judgments with a protective attitude in favour of local 
industries or local governments. Hence, if the decision is against the interest of 
the central or local government it can affect the enforcement. In cases like that 
enforcement often is denied on very vague notions of public interest.225 
Since Chinese local governments have a political responsibility to maintain the 
social stability in the local region, the problem got more intense. Now they even 
might interfere in a judicial ruling if its enforcement could hinder a major local 
business.226 
Additionally, the enforcement of court orders requires assistance and the 
coordination of land registration authorities, banks, taxation offices, and vehicle 
administrations. But in practice, these institutions and the local courts of the 
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respondent are usually not active in providing assistance and cooperation if the 
creditors are from other territories.227 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, judges are appointed, removed and paid 
by local governments228, a relationship that leads to pressure on the courts to 
favour their localities in litigation involving foreigners and parties from elsewhere 
in China, consequently hindering fair adjudication and enforcement of 
judgments.229 Within this financial and administrative structure it is not difficult to 
understand why local courts, willingly or unwillingly, favour local interests. Nor is 
it difficult to understand how easily local governments can interfere with judicial 
enforcement of legally effective judgments.230 Hence, the more local interests 
are involved, it is more difficult to enforce a judgment against a local party. 
Especially, in case of enforcing foreign judgments against a local party, such 
protection could become more dominant. Local protectionism, thus, critically 
reduces the effectiveness of China's judiciary. 
As long ago as 1996 the SPC pointed out:  
‘In an absolute majority of cases, local (judicial) protectionism is linked to 
local protectionist activities of local Party and government authorities 
and, in some cases, it is directly participated in or even directly 
orchestrated by local court leaders. …it is not uncommon for local Party 
and government organs to compel courts to act according to various 
local internal documents or policies by means of threats in the form of 
cutting court funding or removal of judicial personnel from the court.’231 
 
It is the lack of interest in the separation of powers and thus in judicial 
independence and in depoliticization of the judiciary that causes local 
protectionism.232 
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7.8  Varying quality of law enforcement across the nation 
Particularly, local protectionism has further led to the unbalanced development 
of local people’s courts across the nation. The court system in the coastal areas 
of China (east) is better developed than in rural areas of the hinterland (west). 
The reason therefore is, that the economy in coastal areas, has been better off 
and government administrations more liberalized in these regions.233 A more 
developed economy as a consequence will have a higher average of successful 
law enforcement, because people in these regions often have better financial 
status and are more trustworthy.234  
Rural areas on the other hand often suffer from budget constraints due to their 
underdeveloped economy. As a result, the court systems in these areas may be 
subject to more administrative interferences, which helps to explain the more 
frequent occurrence of biased judgment in rural areas.235 Moreover, the 
ramifications of measures to professionalise the judicial personnel and its 
positive impact on enforcement, depends on the region’s economic 
development.236 
7.9  Judicial corruption 
Nevertheless, a tremendous problem of a new Chinese legal system is judicial 
corruption. Judicial corruption exists among judges as individuals and courts as 
collective bodies. One of the most popular forms is that judges accept money, 
gifts and invitations for meals from both parties, the plaintiff and defendant. A 
common phrase in China is: after eating with the plaintiff, he eats with the 
defendant; after he has finished eating with them both, he says that the legal 
system is not perfect.237 Some judges also recommend lawyers to litigants to 
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obtain material gain for themselves. On the other hand, of course, the bribery of 
judicial personnel by lawyers is also a part of the corruption in the PRC.238 
The corruption of the court en bloc appears in different variations. It happens 
that courts fight for jurisdiction by handling cases they not responsible for and 
by competing to obtain the advantage in cases where property or profit is 
involved. They also sometimes refuse to accept cases or delay the hearing of 
cases in order to support local parties. Moreover, courts in some cases, 
inadequately use coercive measures in order to be the first to control property. 
In addition, it has been proven that some courts pervert the law by 
misinterpreting the law, distorting the facts and delivering unjust decisions. And, 
particularly, they make nonlocal judgments difficult to enforce.239 
 
8.  JUDICIAL REFORMS (1999–2014) 
In the past 15 years the SPC has initiated reforms and measures to improve the 
judicial infrastructure.240 The Five-Year Reform Plans for the courts can be seen 
as key reforms. The first Five-Year Reform Plan (1999–2003)241 focuses on 
promoting the quality of judges through a more depoliticized judge selection 
system. In October 2004, the SPC promulgated the outline of the second Five-
Year Reform Plan (2004–08)242.243 The second Five-Year Reform Plan 
appeared particularly ambitious in setting out not less than fifty objectives for 
upgrading the Chinese court system. As a whole, the provisions demonstrated a 
timid awareness of the necessity of greater professionalism, independence, and 
integrity of the judiciary, reducing local protectionism, and stamping out 
corruption, while acknowledging the leadership by the CPC and supervision by 
the people’s congresses at each level.244 One important point likewise was the 
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‘Reforming and Perfecting Work Systems and Methods to Enforce Judgments.’ 
The goals set were the following: 
‘– Taking steps to reform and perfect systems for the enforcement of 
court judgments. The SPC's enforcement organs supervise and guide 
the enforcement work of China's courts. The enforcement organs of 
provincial, autonomous region, and directly administered municipality 
high people's courts will uniformly manage and coordinate enforcement 
work in their jurisdictions. 
– Deepen reforms to the exercise of power for organs that carry out the 
enforcement of judgments. Court enforcement organs at all levels will be 
responsible for executing civil and administrative judicial opinions, 
decisions, and other legal bases, as well as enforcing those portions of 
criminal decisions related to property (including property crimes). With 
regard to the substantive disputes in the process of enforcing decisions 
that require hearings to decide, these should be heard by trial organs 
outside of the enforcement organ. If necessary, specialized trial organs 
can be established. Constructing emergency measures for relief by 
parties in enforcement cases and third parties, such as requesting review 
of decisions by the enforcement organ with regard to important 
procedural questions. 
– Reforming and perfecting the procedure for enforcement of judgments, 
strengthening the system for enforcing judicial interpretations. Actively 
pushing forward legislation on the enforcement of decisions, regularizing 
the behaviour of every enforcement authority. 
– Constructing a national information network on the enforcement of 
court judgments, participating in the construction of the credit system. 
Constructing mechanisms for supervising the enforcement of court 
judgments. Pressing individuals who are subject to judgments to carry 
out their responsibilities. 
– Reforming and perfecting jurisdiction to improve efficiency in the 
enforcement of judgments, reduce the cost of execution, eliminate 
interference, and ensure that the legal rights of parties are protected in a 
timely manner. 
– Exploring new methods in enforcement. Cooperating with relevant 
bureaus against individuals who fail to carry out their responsibilities 
under enforcement orders to take measures such as reporting on their 
property, compulsory audits, imposing limits on their ability to leave the 
country, and releasing lists of people subject to enforcement orders. 
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– Reforming and perfecting systems and procedures for trials for refusing 
to carry out court decisions, and increasing judicial penalties for failure to 
carry out valid decisions or obstructing their execution.’245 
 
The third Five-Year Reform Plan (2009–2013) was issued in March 2009. In 
comparison to the first two reform plans, the SPC focuses more on the mass 
line, as previously mentioned.246 
On 9 July 2014, the SPC issued its most recent fourth Five-Year Reform Plan 
(2014–2018). The plan incorporates eight broad areas: 
 
– Personnel reforms 
– Separate administrative and judicial jurisdiction 
– Improve the operation of the judicial function 
– Improve the protection of human rights 
– Increase judicial transparency 
– Clarify the roles of the four levels of the courts 
– Improve judicial administration 
– Promote reforms relating to petitioning 
 
9.  PROGRESS 
This part of the paper determines the progress and development China has 
made in the last decades in regard of improving its legal system and thus its law 
enforcement. 
 
9.1  Legal education 
However, the shortage of lawyers in general, the lack of legal aid, the low level 
of professionalism and the competence among many lawyers may contribute to 
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the problems involved in establishing a law-based order, the main reason of the 
enforcement problems in the PRC are due to factors other than the legal 
profession.247 Furthermore, the judicial personnel have made a great progress 
in recent decades, and can be expected to continue to improve and to become 
more professional. With the continuous growth of the market economy, law and 
the legal services have become more and more important.248 Following the 
Second Five Year Reform Plan, for example, judges now need to participate in 
annual judicial training to stay in the loop in their professional knowledge so that 
they can deal with a great variety of different cases.249 In the area of 
commercial law, particularly international commercial transactions, some other 
legal education opportunities have also begun in the PRC after the accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).250 For example, local judges from courts 
in the coastal area may have a fair chance to study abroad due to the more 
developed economy and more liberal administration in these regions. 
This opportunity supports the findings of better enforcement records in both the 
judgments and arbitral awards in coastal city courts. These measures are seen 
as important steps to improve the institutionalization and professionalization of 
the Chinese courts.251 As the next step therefore, the education opportunities in 
the rural areas of the hinterland should be equally improved. 
 
9.2  Court organization and cooperation 
Following the newest Five-Year Reform Plan in July 2014 some important 
achievements in regard to the court organization were made. One significant 
part of the personnel reforms is that the SPC endowed judges with the right to 
make independent rulings without the approval of court heads. At the moment 
court decisions are made by a judicial council which does not participate in the 
trial, instead of having judges try cases. The try but not judge practice has 
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always been a key part of China's judicial reform and has been criticized over 
the years for impairing court fairness.252 Unsurprisingly, a fair judgment can only 
be expected from a judge who has listened to the defendants, accusers and 
witnesses and checked the evidence himself. Hence, the separation of trial and 
ruling only leads to inefficiency and unfairness. Moreover, trial judges’ decisions 
no longer have to be signed off by court heads, thus judges can act more 
independently.253 
 
9.3  Judicial independence 
The latest reform outline also focused on cutting links between courts and local 
governments to reduce judicial interference. Furthermore, the reform plan asked 
for the establishment of judicial selection committees at provincial level courts to 
promote professional selection of the bench as well as reduce nepotism within 
local governments.254 Moreover, the funding of local courts will be put under 
uniform administration by provincial authorities and the money and property 
they collect as litigation fees, fines and forfeitures will be rendered to the 
provincial treasury. To address the problem of the localization of the court 
system is a big step forward.255 
 
9.4  Legislative development 
The amendment to the CPL in 2012, inter alia, addressed the improvement of 
the procedures for enforcements and appeals. Accordingly, several articles are 
revised to improve enforcement in civil procedures.256 First, art. 235 of the 
revised CPL gives the procuratorate the right to perform legal supervision over 
the enforcement of civil cases. Second, articles 114 and 115257 impose higher 
fines on persons and entities for refusing to assist the court in the execution of a 
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judgment. Moreover, before the amendments, courts could refuse to enforce 
domestic arbitral awards upon the grounds that the main evidence for 
establishing the facts was insufficient, and the application of the law was 
incorrect.258 Article 237 removes these two grounds and adds another two 
grounds: Articles 237(4) and (5) provide that the court could refuse to enforce 
domestic arbitral awards if ‘the evidence based on which the arbitral award is 
made is falsified’ and ‘the other parties conceal the evidence from the arbitral 
organ and is sufficient to affect the impartiality of the arbitral award’. 
 
9.5  Judicial corruption 
The result of judicial corruption is that ‘judicial impartiality, distorted the public 
view of judicial organs, damaged the reputation of the state in the minds of the 
public and undermined the exercise of judicial power’.259 
At least the SPC recognized the problem and started to fight these grievances. 
According to its 2014 work report, economic crimes, crimes of bribery and 
corruption, and crimes of dereliction of duty were punished in accordance with 
law. Fully brought into play the role of criminal trials in punishing corruption, 
increasing the strength of the attack on crimes such as corruption and bribery. 
Completing trial in 29,000 cases of corruption and bribery or dereliction of duty 
by state personnel, and convicting 31,000 people. In its work plan for 2014, the 
SPC furthermore, states that one important goal is to: 
‘Actively participate in the struggle against corruption, increasing the 
strength of corrections against corruption crimes in accordance with law, 
following the idea of striking at both tigers and flies together, to maintain 
a high level of pressure against crimes of corruption and bribery and 
promoting the construction of clean governance’ 
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10.  CASE STUDIES 
It is essential for achieving recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
and arbitral awards in China to consider the situation also from a practical 
perspective rather than solely from a theoretical analyses.260 In the following, 
therefore, important cases regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments as 
well as the enforcement of arbitral awards will be discussed. 
 
10.1  Cases: foreign judgments 
As noted previously, art. 282 of the CPL is the most fundamental legal provision 
to enforce foreign judgments in Chinese courts and includes the statutory 
requirements for enforcement of foreign judgments:261 
‘– the judgment or ruling rendered by a foreign court is already effective,  
– the country of the trial forum and China have concluded a bilateral 
treaty or have both acceded to a multilateral treaty on recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, or have a reciprocal relationship of 
recognition and enforcement of judgments, and  
– the foreign judgment does not contradict the fundamental principles of 
Chinese law or does not violate Chinese sovereignty, national security or 
social public interests.’262 
 
Due to the fact that at the moment mostly no binding bilateral or multilateral 
legal framework exists, the principle of reciprocity is possibly even the most 
important requirement.263 Hence, in judicial practice, the reciprocity relationship 
has been an instrument that has been most frequently applied by Chinese 
courts in the past decades in refusing to recognize or enforce foreign 
judgments.264 Thus next, some prominent cases in accordance with the 
application of the principle will be considered. 
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10.1.1  The Gomi Akira Case265 
In this regard, the Gomi Akira Case is the most representative case which 
occurred in 1994.266 Gomi Akira (a Japanese citizen) asked the Dalian 
Intermediate People’s Court to recognize and enforce a Japanese judgment 
and two rulings.267 The Dalian court pointed out that there was no multilateral or 
bilateral treaty governing such matters between China and Japan. The Dalian 
court and its superior court, the high people’s court, referred the case to the 
SPC for final guidance.268 The response upheld the Dalian court’s opinion and, 
furthermore, stated that the two countries had not yet established reciprocity. 
Therefore, the Chinese court should not recognize and enforce Japanese 
judgments and rulings and hence, the application for recognition and 
enforcement was dismissed in accordance with art. 268 of the CPL (now art. 
282).269 The problem is that the reciprocity requirement easily leads to 
retaliatory treatment,270 its abandonment, however, would encourage mutual 
enforcement of judgments. 
  
10.1.2  Other representative cases 
Especially, after the Gomi Akira Case, an investigation into the most 
representative cases reveals that the requested Chinese courts dismissed 
applications for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the PRC 
mainly or solely based on dissatisfaction of the principle of reciprocity as 
requirement of art. 282 of the CLP. 
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In the case of the application of Deutsche Bank271  for the recognition and 
enforcement of a Frankfurt judgment the Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court 
explicitly pointed out that no reciprocal relationship could be proved to exist 
between China and Germany, and China’s sovereignty would be at stake if 
recognition and enforcement were granted to the Frankfurt judgment. The 
Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court gave no extra explanation for its refusal. 
In addition to that, neither the principle of reciprocity was clarified, nor were 
other requirements touched upon.272 
More recently, in 2010, another case, Oliver Otto Dufek v. Siegmund 
Kahlbacher;273  proves the same. An application for the recognition and 
enforcement of two English judgments at the Beijing No. 2 Court merely 
referred to art. 266 of the CLP (now art. 282), and determined that on the one 
hand, there were no bilateral or multilateral treaties available and on the other 
hand, there was no reciprocal relationship between China and England 
established. As a result, the application for the recognition and enforcement 
was refused.274 
The cases shown above, emphasis quite well the significance of the principle of 
reciprocity. However, the principle is quite important, there is especially one 
other ground of refusal which should be considered.275 Besides the reciprocity 
relationship, the due service requirement plays an important part. In the past 
decades Chinese courts frequently refused recognition and enforcement on the 
sole ground that the service of the judgments on the Chinese defendant by way 
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of post276 was unacceptable.277 It is remarkable that the Chinese courts referred 
to the same grounds and hence, that the cases278 have some important 
characteristics in common: First, the basic ground for the refusal of recognition 
is the undue service of judicial documents including, inter alia, the summons 
and foreign judgments. Second, the requested Chinese courts hardly 
addressed other requirements which could be relevant for the recognition and 
enforcement. Third, one striking characteristic is that all the foreign judgments 
refused based on undue service were from the countries which had established 
a reciprocal relationship with China in the sense of art. 282 of the CPL. Thus, it 
appears that once the principle of reciprocity is guaranteed or satisfied, the due 
service requirement comes out of the woodwork as the most important, if not 
the only, consideration of Chinese courts.279 This shows that it is wise to pay 
special attention to both requirements. 
 
10.1.3  The HuklaMatratzen GmbH Case280 
Due to the fact that the principle of reciprocity is the primary concern of the 
Chinese courts and the investigation of the due service requirement merely 
follows, unless the principle is not satisfied, it is not often that both requirements 
are involved in one single case.281 Nevertheless, one provoking case 
concerning both requirements occurred in 2010. Because of its significance a 
brief summary follows: 
In the HuklaMatratzen GmbH Case, the German applicant HuklaMatratzen 
GmbH, applied for the recognition and enforcement of a judgment issued in 
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Offenbach, Germany. The Chinese defendant the Beijing Hukla Ltd, didn’t 
defend the case at the recognition stage. Due to the fact, that there is no single 
bilateral treaty or international convention between Germany and China on 
judicial assistance including the mutual recognition and enforcement of 
judgments, as mentioned above, the applicant had to prove the presence of the 
prerequisites of a reciprocal relationship.282 In the knowledge that the principle 
of reciprocity plays a crucial role for a successful application the 
HuklaMatratzen GmbH focused on this requirement. Thus, the applicant cited a 
former case283 in its pleading and claimed that because of the occurred case 
the principle of reciprocity according to art. 282 of the CPL between China and 
Germany is satisfied.284 However, the Chinese court surprisingly just addressed 
the due service requirement, in referring to the Hague Service Convention 285 
which applies to both Germany and China. In regard to the reservation China 
made under the Convention the crucial point was that the resulting judgment 
was served way of post which completely contravened the reservation of art. 10 
of the Convention. According to this fact, the Chinese court then pointed out 
that the German judgment was not yet legally binding on the defendant, and 
hence the application was refused because the judgment was not legally 
effective in the sense of art. 282 of the CPL. Due the service of judgment by 
way of post, the German judgment lacked legal effect and therefore was 
refused.286 
 
10.2   Cases: arbitral awards 
As mentioned above, arbitration awards can be enforced with a greater ease 
than foreign judgments in the PRC. In this subsection important case law in 
regard of enforcing arbitral awards in China will be discussed. Hence, positive 
as well as negative trends will be examined. However, one should keep in mind 
that there is no system of a binding precedent in China. 
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10.2.1  The Ningbo Case287 
This case from 2009 concerns the persistent problem, whether foreign 
arbitration institutions could conduct arbitration in the PRC. In the past, those 
awards were very unlikely to be recognised and enforced in the PRC. However, 
the Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court suggest that there may exist a new 
category of awards called non-domestic awards which are enforceable pursuant 
to the New York Convention.288 The case concerned a challenge against the 
enforcement of an ICC award made in Beijing. Nevertheless, the court’s opinion 
that the award was a non-domestic award, within the meaning of the second 
sentence of art. 1 of New York Convention,289  and, therefore, ruled that the 
award should be enforced pursuant to the New York Convention. 
Due to the fact, that there is no system of binding precedents, it is still too early 
to conclude if the decision is the start of a change in the relevant jurisprudence 
in general. Moreover, the court’s decision has not resolved the question of 
whether foreign arbitration institutions can conduct arbitrations seated in China 
and produce awards that are definitely valid and enforceable in China.290 Thus, 
it remains bold for parties to provide for arbitration in the PRC under the 
administration of a foreign arbitration institution in their arbitration agreement. 
Therefore, it is still recommendable to stipulate in an arbitration agreement that 
arbitral proceedings that are to be administered by a foreign arbitral institution 
shall be held outside of the PRC. 
 
10.2.2  The Longlide Case291 
In Longlide the SPC upheld the validity of an arbitration clause involving an ICC 
arbitration with the seat of arbitration in Shanghai.292 In October 2010, the 
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applicant Longlide Packaging, a Chinese company located in Anhui Province, 
entered into a Sales Contract with respondent BP Agnati S.R.L, a company 
seated in Italy. The arbitration clause states that: 
‘any dispute arising from or in connection with this contract shall be 
submitted to arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce 
(‘ICC’) Court of Arbitration according to its arbitration rules, by one or 
more arbitrators. The place of jurisdiction shall be Shanghai, China. The 
arbitration shall be conducted in English.’ 
 
The applicant claimed that under PRC law, the arbitration agreement should be 
invalid for three reasons: First, the ICC Court of Arbitration is not an arbitration 
institution recognized by the China Arbitration Act. Second, the seat of ICC 
arbitration in Shanghai would violate China’s public policy because it could 
infringe China’s judicial sovereignty. Third, even if the ICC Court of Arbitration in 
Shanghai issued an award, such award is a domestic award, and hence the 
New York Convention is not applicable for its recognition and enforcement in 
the PRC.293 
The review was undertaken by the Intermediate Court of Hefei City (Hefei 
Court). First, the Hefei Court decided that Chinese law shall be the governing 
law in investigating the validity of the arbitration agreement. The Hefei Court 
stated that the Arbitration Law does not explicitly address the crucial point if a 
foreign arbitration institution is allowed to conduct arbitration in the PRC. 
Moreover, the court noted that due to the fact that both parties selected 
Shanghai as the seat of arbitration, the arbitration shall be classified as a 
domestic arbitration, and not as non-domestic described in art. 1 of the New 
York Convention.294 Another important provision in this regard is art. 10 (3) of 
the Arbitration Law: ‘The establishment of an arbitration commission shall be 
registered with the administrative department of justice of the relevant province, 
autonomous region or municipality directly under the Central Government.’  




As a consequence a foreign arbitration institution, acting as a service provider, 
needs the permission of and applying for registration in the appropriate 
administrative agency of justice. The fact is that the PRC still has not opened its 
arbitration market to foreign arbitration institutions, and thus a foreign arbitration 
institution cannot conduct arbitration proceedings inside China. Therefore, the 
court held that the arbitration agreement between the Chinese and the Italian 
company is invalid.295 
Afterwards the Higher People’s Court of Anhui Province (Anhui Court) reviewed 
the decision. On the one hand, the Anhui Court agreed with the lower court’s 
view that Chinese law should be the governing law for this issue. On the other 
hand, it disagrees with the substantive issues of the lower court’s ruling. The 
Anhui Court stated that under art. 16 of the Arbitration Law: ‘An arbitration 
agreement shall contain the following particulars: (1) an expression of intention 
to apply for arbitration; (2) matters for arbitration; and (3) a designated 
arbitration commission.’ All three elements were fulfilled by the parties’ clause. 
Hence, the ruling of the lower court that the arbitration agreement is invalid 
because foreign arbitration institutions cannot conduct arbitration in China lacks 
merit.296 
According to the above described reporting system the Intermediate People’s 
Court of Hefei and the High People’s Court of Anhui reported the case to the 
SPC. The SPC upheld the majority view of the Anhui Court. Since the three 
elements of a valid arbitration agreement had been satisfied, under art. 16 of 
the Arbitration Law, the SPC determined that the arbitration clause is valid.  
However, the SPC did not address the question if the law allows foreign 
arbitration institutions, to hold arbitrations in China. Moreover, it did not address 
how awards rendered in the PRC by foreign arbitration institutions will be 
characterized (domestic/non-domestic) and if they are characterized as non-
domestic whether and how they will be enforced in the PRC. 
 




11.  IMPLICATIONS 
The case studies show that there are some important requirements that 
consistently occur and thus have to be considered for a successful application 
of a foreign judgment as well as an arbitral award. The following subsection 
tries to give indications how to satisfy the crucial prerequisites. 
 
11.1  Implications for enforcing a foreign judgment in China 
Considering the above discussed cases the question is, even if both 
requirements, the principle of reciprocity and the due service requirement, are 
satisfied in one single case, if the requested Chinese courts will find other 
grounds to refuse the recognition and enforcement. But even if it appears that 
Chinese courts look for any other defences for refusal, the likelihood that they 
will refer to other prerequisites is not really high. Other grounds have been 
rarely referred to in the past, however, they are not completely unknown to the 
courts.297 Hence, the focus of the implications is also set on the principle of 
reciprocity and the due service requirement. 
 
11.1.1  Principle of reciprocity 
The most difficult requirement to fulfil is obviously the principle of reciprocity. It 
is essential to find a precedent under the principle in the country where the 
judgment is made. Currently in most of the countries no precedent exits. And 
exactly this is the dilemma of the reciprocity requirement. Foreign courts are 
thus strongly advised to reflect on this desperate situation. They are the ones 
who have to take the first step to recognize Chinese judgments to break the 
dilemma residing in the reciprocity requirement.298 Especially in considering the 
improvement of the Chinese legal and judicial system in the last decades and 
its growing acceptance worldwide. Otherwise the doom loop of retaliatory 
treatment will continue. Therefore, the HuklaMatratzen GmbH Case sets a good 
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example how the cycle can be broken. Clearly, to find a solution for this problem 
is not in the hands of the applicant. 
 
11.1.2  Due service requirement 
In the first place, bilateral treaties, in case of existence, in regard of the service 
of process between China and the foreign state have to be considered. A 
deviation from the Hague Service Convention and its methods of service might 
be possible. Otherwise, the satisfaction of the due service requirement can be 
quite easily achieved if the Hague Service Convention is strictly followed by 
both the rendering courts and applicants with special attention to the 
reservation of the Convention made by China.299 
With regard of the above discussed cases, the legal way to serve a foreign 
summons and judgment to a Chinese defendant within China is to serve the 
document via the judicial assistance of the competent central authority of the 
PRC,300 for example the Ministry of Justice and the higher people’s court of the 
district where the defendant is located.301  
 
11.1.3  Miscellaneous 
Moreover, the foreign judgment shall be a final and legally binding decision in 
accordance with the laws of the country where the judgment is made. At this 
point it also should be mentioned that Chinese courts are not likely to recognize 
default judgments (no trial on the substantial facts during the court hearing).302 
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11.2 Implications for enforcing a foreign arbitral award in China 
In this part of the paper important issues concerning the application for 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards will be briefly 
summarized. 
 
11.2.1  General remarks 
First, a few things in regard to the procedure of an application for enforcement 
in general: In the beginning an application has to be filed, a copy of the 
arbitration agreement and of the arbitration award, including a notarized 
Chinese translation of the award has to be provided. Moreover, the foreign 
arbitral award must be submitted within two years of the award being issued, as 
noted previously. The average duration of enforcement is about six months from 
the lodging of the application to the enforcement.303 
 
11.2.2  New York Convention 
Due to the fact that the PRC is a signatory to the New York Convention, besides 
at least 140 other states, the New York Convention award has thematic priority. 
Similar, to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of 1965, China made two 
reservations in regard to the New York Convention: 
The reciprocity reservation, by which China's agreement is restricted to foreign 
arbitral awards made in the territory of a state which is also a party to the New 
York Convention. Furthermore, China also made the commercial reservation. 
According to the SPC 1987 Notice, China would apply the New York 
Convention only to disputes arising from commercial legal relationships304 of a 
contractual or non-contractual nature, but excluding disputes between foreign 
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investors and governments of host countries.305 Hence, these reservations and 
moreover, the grounds of refusal in art. 5 of the New York Convention have to 
be considered whilst applying for enforcement. 
 
11.2.3  Reciprocity principle 
The reciprocity principle will be required in the following situations: the award 
was made in countries that are not parties to the New York Convention, or was 
rendered in the territory of a State member to the New York Convention but in 
cases of a non-commercial nature under Chinese Law or before the New York 
Convention become applicable in China (22 April 1987). Moreover, unless a 
specific judicial assistance agreement that provides for the mutual recognition of 
arbitral awards have been signed with that country, (only a few of the bilateral 
treaties signed by China refer to the recognition of awards). In practice, the 
reciprocity mechanism codified by art. 283 of the CPL has not much effect due 
to local protectionism.306 
 
11.2.4  Miscellaneous 
Furthermore, it should again be mentioned that art. 283 of the CPL only applies 
to a foreign arbitration institutions, excluding ad hoc arbitral awards. In regard to 
the Ningbo and Longlide cases, the arbitral proceedings that are to be 
administered by a foreign arbitral institution shall be still held outside of the 
PRC. Apart from this, the remaining dispute between CIETAC and its former 
sub-commissions should stay in memory while filing an arbitration clause. 
 
12.  CONCLUSION 
The legal system of China has developed throughout millennia in different 
ways, based on the peculiarities of Chinese history, tradition, Confucianism and 
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especially, on the importance of the administrative authority, rather than on vast 
sets of predetermined abstract general rules.307 In the course of establishing 
and developing a market economy, law is still not effective enough because 
social norms and ethics are deeply rooted in the Chinese culture.308 The drastic 
social transformation from a centrally planned economy towards a more market 
oriented economy with fast development and urbanization does require a strong 
government with a clear reform agenda. Particularly in China, where the 
government has retained considerable control of the economy.309 The 
achievements of the 30 years should not be depreciated, but it is important to 
recognise that the many problems with the judiciary and its work are deeply 
grounded in the political system and are not of a nature that can be easily 
changed.310 Hence, despite the progress in improving judicial efficiency, the 
progress, however, is fragile.311 
Lubman, considering the economic and legal development in China, once 
stated: ‘the economic bird has already escaped from its cage, the economic 
plan, but the legal bird remains in its own cage, although it is stirring and the 
dimensions of the cage may be changing.’312 
Judicial independence in a Western style will be difficult to achieve in the 
foreseeable future,313 in particular, due to the fact that there is no separation of 
powers and no mechanism of checks and balances in the PRC. 
Successful enforcement still depends, for example, on the location of the court. 
Beijing and the coastal cities have greater success in enforcement than the 
cities inland. The hierarchy of the court issuing the enforcement order also 
matters. 
Hence, it should be mentioned that this matter is a global matter and not only 
an issue concerning the PRC or a single country. The recognition and 
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enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards has drawn more and 
more attention around the globe and has actually become an issue of enormous 
practical importance. However, the international community, under the auspices 
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,314 has been cooperating 
closely and actively in the hope of reaching a truly international judgments 
convention,315 it is still more of an illusion that such a convention might be 
adopted in the short run, and the fruits that have been reaped are far from being 
commended.316 
As an alternative, a lot of states have concluded bilateral treaties for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. China concluded bilateral 
treaties in this respect with around 30 countries317 so far.318 Indeed, bilateral 
cooperation is an option, but it is far from ideal. Thus, the problem of law 
enforcement is still a matter that is predominantly handled by individual 
countries relying on their own disparate laws, which signifies that 
inconsistencies among the laws of states and the ensuing conflicts will 
inevitably surface.319 In this context, as noted above, the principle of reciprocity 
is a huge obstacle. This requirement damages the parties’ interests as the Gomi 
Akira Case has proven.320 If all countries would adhere to the principle, the 
enforcement of foreign judgments will never be possible. A better solution would 
be presumed reciprocity. Reciprocity is presumed to exist if the other party has 
no evidence to prove that the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment is impossible.321 Some reasons why the current factual reciprocity 
requirement is unjustified and unfeasible are for example: 
On the one hand, the application for recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment is submitted by a party and thus, no official institution is involved in 
the process. The government or other governmental institutions of origin have 
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no opportunities to declare whether they would like to offer reciprocity to 
recognize and enforce a judgment from the requested state.322 On the other 
hand, reciprocity is an act of the state on which both parties have no influence. 
Moreover, with regard to factual reciprocity, it is difficult for a party to prove that 
the state of origin offers reciprocity if no judgment was previously recognized 
and enforced between both states. However, under presumed reciprocity, these 
obstacles would be largely resolved.323 The abandonment of factual reciprocity 
is a legislative issue, not a judicial issue.324 
The SPC stated in its 2014 work plan to promote actively the establishment of a 
peaceful China with the rule of law. On China’s long march towards a rule of 
law, one should be anxious that the judiciary and effective law enforcement are 
crucial issues. 
On the one hand ‘without law there is little that can be said about justice and 
fairness’. But, on the other hand, a just law does not guarantee the justice of 
law and a refusal to obey the law creates a worse situation than one where 
there is no law to go by.’325 
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